Abstract
This paper provides a commentary on the target article by Salas and Yuen, who propose a revision to the 'left convexity hypothesis' of Kaplan-Solms and Solms that there is no evidence for involvement of left hemisphere regions in the mental apparatus. Salas and Yuen provide a theoretical review and detailed clinical description that forms the basis for their argument that left dorso-medial frontal regions may be involved in ego regulation of emotion. In this commentary, the theoretical basis for Salas and Yuen's argument is considered in light of cognitive and affective neuroscience models of emotion regulation. Whilst this commentary is supportive of Salas' and Yuen's position, the models discussed distinguish different roles of inner language associated with labeling and reappraisal, or with distancing or shifting of inner perspective. This clinical, theoretical and empirical extension of Salas and Yuen's position points the way to further investigation regarding the role and nature of inner language with regard to the experience and regulation of emotion.
Background
The target paper of Salas and Yuen is concerned with the role of the left prefrontal cortical region in the mental apparatus described by Freud. The authors argue that an update on Kaplan-Solms and Solms ' (2000) position that damage to left frontal areas does not impede the function of the mental apparatus, which was based on a case with a lesion in Broca's area, is required. Salas and Yuen review this position conceptually and then clinically through the report of a case of psychoanalytic therapy with Professor F, who sustained predominantly left dorso-medial prefrontal damage. The authors propose a basis for understanding the impact of left dorso-medial damage on ego regulation of emotion via preconscious inner language, and the conscious voices of the super ego.
In this commentary I will set out parallel theoretical frameworks and related research that speak to the issue of the role of left frontal regions in regulation of emotion.
Whilst Salas and Yuen's proposed update of the left convexity hypothesis can be defended by reference to the broader affective neuroscience literature on emotion regulation and cognition, some additional points can be considered alongside their conclusions and this commentary seeks to extend rather than refute their position.
First I will consider the revised position alongside the literature on emotion regulation, specifically the model of Ochsner & Gross (2008) . Second I will review alternative neuroanatomical accounts, drawing on the distinction between dorsomedial and dorso-lateral networks associated with cognitive and emotional regulation. Specifically I will briefly summarise relevant literature concerning the functional and anatomical distinctions between the default mode network and stimulus driven attention networks. I will argue that whilst consistent with Salas and Yuen's revised position, reference to contemporary network models of self-regulation could cast additional light on our understanding of the nature of the mental apparatus, and indeed the processes described in Salas and Yuen's case. This raises a question as to whether the 'core deficit' in the case of Professor F is best considered in terms of inner language or thought within the ego and super-ego functions, or inner perspective, such that distancing or reflective inner language that binds within it the capacity to distinguish internal from external and self from other is at the heart of the issue here. A potentially fruitful avenue for further exploration of the issues of balance between the internal and external and the role of inner perspective alongside inner language might be gleaned from neuroimaging work concerning the dissociable roles of the default mode network (DMN) and stimulus or goal driven attentional networks.
The default mode network in affect regulation and inner experience
The picture painted by Salas and Yuen of Professor F's feelings and inner life is rich and compelling. The authors weave a psychological tapestry linking past experiences with internalized processes and basic emotional responses within a neuroanatomical architecture distinguishing limbic system emotion activation, ventro-medial behavioral regulation, lateral PFC verbal self-regulation and inner thought. However, I have here argued that the literature on the role of medial cortical structures in inner language and self-regulation provides additional details that enrich or extend the Salas and Yuen position, specifically whether the focus here goes beyond inner language and concerns a particular type or perspective of inner life, or the flexibility to adopt a third-person perspective as a component of verbal self-regulation.
Professor F describes not only enhanced experiences of all emotions (reduced regulation), but also an array of changes to his inner life. These include at times an absence of inner thought, not bland as one might think if describing pure 'absence' but rather contemplative and rich with non-linguistic experience: 'They are moments of pure sensation'. There is reflexive space but an absence of reflexive content.
However, Professor F's mind is not always blank. He experiences inner dialogue involving critical inner voices associated with his past experiences, yet he is unable to step out of these dialogues. He has the potential to 'think' his fears of being unable to speak, express himself, albeit in a somewhat faltering way.
One way of accounting for this varied presentation of types of, and changes to, inner language and inner life could be drawn from the literature describing the distinct but internally related goals such as, for example, judging the motivational or personal value or significance of a stimulus. The second subsystem has as its most interconnected hub the dorso-medial PFC (DMPFC) hub, which is connected with the temporo-parietal junction, lateral temporal cortex and temporal pole. The core function here appears to be introspection about mental states of self or others.
Andrews-Hanna concludes that this subsystem is engaged when we 'reflect upon, evaluate or appraise social information …[and] … can be directed to our own or others thoughts, feelings or desires' (p. 10).
The description of the architecture and proposed function of the DMPFC subsystem of the DMN resonates with Salas and Yuen's position and their description of Professor F, but does not fully address the questions regarding the distinction between inner perspective and content of inner language. Implicit in Andrews-Hanna's description of this system is the ability to distinguish own from others' mental states, as well as inferring the nature of those inner states. Evident in the case of Professor F is the absence of inner thought in the absence of any stimulus, and enhanced capacity for accessing his emotional inner life with an absence of spontaneous (verbal) reappraisal, which might temper emotional reactions. This would be consistent with an impairment of the DMPFC hub, resulting in reduced spontaneous mentation, and a related deficit in generation of a reflective inner dialogue. In addition is the presence of inner voices that hark from his past and carry the harsh criticism and standards that he internalized in childhood. One must assume that this form of spontaneous inner mentation can be dissociated from that which might take a distancing or reflective perspective on inner life, or from an alternative content or function of inner speech that is itself directly regulating of affect. Given the bilaterality of the DMPFC hub, it is possible that Professor F has some spared ability in his capacity to reflect upon mental states and distinguish his own experiences, but a deficit in a more specific representational aspect of these processes: for example, the spontaneous representational (linguistic) labeling of inner experiences required to scaffold sufficient perspective or distance to disengage from emotionally driven harsh inner voices, or verbally reappraise and down-regulate basic emotional responses. One wonders the extent to which the careful and ongoing therapy provided a neuropsychotherapeutic compensatory social 'milieu' within which Professor F could 'hear' himself, a shared, cognitive space within which he could glimpse a distanced perspective, articulated in linguistic representational forms, if only momentarily. Ochsner and Gross's review of the role of verbal reappraisal in affect regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2008) , and on the emerging study of the DMN and its role in inner mentation (Andrews-Hanna, 2012) . Whilst it is clear from a consideration of these differing strands of literature that Professor F's altered inner experiences, including changes in his capacity to respond to and manage emotional responses, can be attributed to his left DMPFC damage, the paper raises more questions than it answers regarding the specific nature of this deficit in regulation and perspective taking. Is Professor F's deficit one of loss of inner language required for regulation, or a deficit in perspective taking? Are representational aspects of inner language required in order to generate the perspective required for regulation of affect and switching of attention between inner voices? How is Professor F so able to generate coherent verbal narrative reflections of his memory of experiences marked by absence of reflexive language? What role does the shared mentation of psychotherapy play in either temporary or enduring changes in these functions for patients with impairments impinging upon the mental apparatus?
Summary
Clearly, whilst Salas and Yuen's position should be taken as a further step in the development of the neuropsychoanalysis project, and a robust development of Kaplan-Solms and Solms initial position regarding the left convexity, further analysis of these concepts and experiences through experimental, clinical and conceptual work is required.
